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Formation
Ph.D. Economics, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois, USA Dissertation "Three Essays on the Informational Aspects of Untrustworthy Experts, Elusive Agents and Corrupt Supervisors'' B.A. in Economics, Bilkent University, Ankara, Turkey
Biographie
Gorkem Celik teaches economics in the PhD, advanced masters, and MBA programs. Before joining ESSEC in 2009, he worked at the University of British Columbia in Vancouver. Gorkem is an economic theorist. He studies what type of economic institutions and mechanisms are needed to achieve specific objectives. His main focus is on settings where individuals hold relevant private information (such as the cost of providing a service or the value of using it), but are unwilling to reveal this information due to conflicting self interests. Gorkem uses game theory to understand how people react to different rules under different information structures. Gorkem's research is published in several academic journals, including Journal of Economic Theory and Games and Economic Behavior. During his doctoral studies, Gorkem has been named the inaugural recipient of the Robert Eisner Graduate Fellowship for his distinguished performance in teaching and research. Research Statement (August 2008)
Thèmes de Recherche
Thèmes
Primary: Contract theory, Economics of Information Secondary: Microeconomics, Game Theory, Industrial Organization, Positive Political Theory, Law and Economics
Projets en Cours
Equilibrium Rejection of a Mechanism, joint work with Michael Peters, under revision.
Publications académiques
Articles
"Optimal Auctions with Simultaneous and Costly Participation " (G. Celik, O. Yilankaya), The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Advances) , Jul 2009, Vol. 9, Numéro 1
"Mechanism Design with Collusive Supervision" (G. Celik), Journal of Economic Theory, Jan 2009, Vol. 144, Numéro 1, p. 69‑95
"On the Optimality of Nonmaximal Fines in the Presence of Corruptible Enforcers" (G. Celik, S. Sayan), Review of Economic Design, Sep 2008, Vol. 12, Numéro 3, p. 209‑227
"Counter Marginalization of Information Rents: Implementing Negatively Correlated Compensation Schemes for Colluding Parties" (G. Celik), The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Contributions), Feb 2008, Vol. 8, Numéro 1
"Mechanism Design with Weaker Incentive Compatibility Constraints" (G. Celik), Games and Economic Behavior, Jul 2006, Vol. 56, Numéro 1, p. 37‑44
Working papers
"Equilibrium Rejection of a Mechanism" (avec M. Peters). The University of British Columbia, Oct 08.
"Interested Experts: Do They Know More?" The University of British Columbia, Mar 03.
Autres activités pédagogiques
2002 - 2009 - Assistant Professor, the University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada Oct 2006-Aug 2007 - Visiting Assistant Professor, Koc University, Istanbul, Turkey
Prix et distinctions
2000-2001: Robert Eisner Graduate Fellowship, Department of Economics, Department of Economics, Northwestern University (awarded annually to a graduate student who has distinguished himself in both teaching and research) 1998: Distinction in the Preliminary Exams in Microeconomics, Macroeconomics and Econometrics, Department of Economics, Northwestern University 1997-1998: University Fellowship, Northwestern University
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